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MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion" of the Court.
Under § 303(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, 46 Stat. 687, as amended, 19
U.S.C. § 1303(a) (Supp. V, 1975), whenever a foreign country pays a "bounty
or grant" upon the exportation of a product from that country, the Secretary
of the Treasury is required to levy a countervailing duty, "equal to the net
amount of such bounty or grant," upon importation of the product into the
United States. The issue in this case is whether Japan confers a "bounty" or
"grant" on certain consumer electronic products by failing to impose a com-
modity tax on those products when they are exported, while imposing the tax
on the products when they are sold in Japan.
I.
Under the Commodity Tax Law of Japan, Law No. 48 of 1962, see App.
44-48, a variety of consumer goods, including the electronic products at issue
here, are subject to an "indirect" tax-a tax levied on the goods themselves,
and computed as a percentage of the manufacturer's sales price rather than the
income or wealth of the purchaser or seller. The Japanese tax applies both to
products manufactured in Japan and to those imported into Japan. On goods
manufactured in Japan, the tax is levied upon shipment from the factory; im-
*Editor's note: The footnotes to the opinion have been omitted.
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ported products are taxed when they are withdrawn from the customs ware-
house. Only goods destined for consumption in Japan are subject to the tax,
however. Products shipped for export are exempt, and any tax paid upon the
shipment of a product is refunded if the product is subsequently exported.
Thus the tax is "remitted" on exports.
In April 1970 petitioner, an American manufacturer of consumer electronic
products, filed a petition with the Commissioner of Customs, requesting as-
sessment of countervailing duties on a number of consumer electronic prod-
ucts exported from Japan to this country. Petitioner alleged that Japan had
bestowed a "bounty or grant" upon exportation of these products by, inter
alia, remitting the Japanese Commodity Tax that would have been imposed
had the products been sold within Japan. In January 1976, after soliciting the
views of interested parties and conducting an investigation pursuant to
Treasury Department regulations, see 19 C.F.R. § 159.47(c) (1977), the Acting
Commissioner of Customs published a notice of final determination, rejecting
petitioner's request. 41 Fed. Reg. 1298 (1976).
Petitioner then filed suit in the Customs Court, claiming that the Treasury
Department had erred in concluding that remission of the Japanese Commod-
ity Tax was not a bounty or grant within the purview of the countervailing
duty statute. The Department defended on the ground that, since the remission
of indirect taxes was "nonexcessive," the statute did not require assessment of
a countervailing duty. In the Department's terminology, a remission of taxes is
"nonexcessive" if it does not exceed the amount of tax paid or otherwise due;
thus, for example, if a tax of $5 is levied on goods at the factory, the return of
the $5 upon exportation would be "nonexcessive," whereas a payment of $8
from the government to the manufacturer upon exportation would be "exces-
sive" by $3. The Department pointed out that the current version of § 303 is in
all relevant respects unchanged from the countervailing duty statute enacted
by Congress in 1897, and that the Secretary-in decisions dating back to 1898
-has always taken the position that the nonexcessive remission of an indirect
tax is not a bounty or grant within the meaning of the statute.
On cross-motions for summary judgments, the Customs Court ruled in
favor of petitioner and ordered the Secretary to assess countervailing duties on
all Japanese consumer electronic products specified in petitioner's complaint.
430 F. Supp. 242 (1977). The court acknowledged the Secretary's longstanding
interpretation of the statute. It concluded, however, that this administrative
practice could not be sustained in light of this Court's decision in Downs v.
United States, 187 U.S. 496 (1903), which held that an export bounty had been
conferred by a complicated Russian scheme for the regulation of sugar pro-
duction and sale, involving, among other elements, remission of excise taxes in
the event of exportation.
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On appeal by the government, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,
dividing 3-2, reversed the judgment of the Customs Court and remanded for
entry of summary judgment in favor of the United States. 562 F.2d 1209
(1977). The majority opinion distinguished Downs on the ground that it did
not decide the question of whether nonexcessive remission of an indirect tax,
standing alone, constitutes a bounty or grant upon exportation. The court then
examined the language of § 303 and the legislative history of the 1897 provi-
sion and concluded that, "in determining whether a bounty or grant has been
conferred, it is the economic result of the foreign government's action which
controls." 562 F.2d, at 1216. Relying primarily on the "long-continued" and
"uniform" administrative practice, id., at 1218-1219, 1222-1223, and secon-
darily on congressional "acquiescence" in this practice through repeated re-
enactment of the controlling statutory language, id., at 1220, the court held
that interpretation of "bounty or grant" so as not to include a nonexcessive
remission of an indirect tax is "a lawfully permissible interpretation of § 303."
562 F.2d, at 1223.
We granted certiorari, - U.S. - (1978), and we now affirm.
If.
It is undisputed that the Treasury Department adopted the statutory inter-
pretation at issue here less than a year after passage of the basic countervailing
duty statute in 1897, see T.D. 19321, 1 Synopsis of [Treasury] Decisions 696
(1898), and that the Department has uniformly maintained this position for
over 80 years. This longstanding and consistent administrative interpretation is
entitled to considerable weight.
When faced with a problem of statutory construction, this Court shows great defer-
ence to the interpretation given the statute by the officers or agency charged with its
administration. "To sustain [an agency's] application of [a] statutory term, we need
not find that its construction is the only reasonable one, or even that it is the result we
would have reached had the question arisen in the first instance in judicial pro-
ceedings." Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965), quoting Unemployment Com-
pensation Commission v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 153 (1946).
Moreover, an administrative "practice has peculiar weight when it involves a
contemporaneous construction of a statute by the (persons] charged with the
responsibility of setting its machinery in motion, of making the parts work ef-
ficiently and smoothly while they are yet untried and new." Norwegian Nitro-
gen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 (1933); see, e.g., Power
Reactor Co. v. Electricians, 367 U.S. 396, 408 (1961).
The question is thus whether, in light of the normal aids to statutory con-
struction, the Department's interpretation is "sufficiently reasonable" to be
accepted by a reviewing court. Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
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421 U.S. 60, 75 (1975). Our examination of the language, the legislative
history, and the overall purpose of the 1897 provision persuades us that the
Department's initial construction of the statute was far from unreasonable;
and we are unable to find anything in the events subsequent to that time that
convinces us that the Department was required to abandon this interpretation.
* *i *
B.
Regardless of whether this legislative history absolutely compelled the Secre-
tary to interpret "bounty or grant" so as not to encompass any nonexcessive
remission of an indirect tax, there can be no doubt that such a construction
was reasonable in light of the statutory purpose. Cf. Mourning v. Family Pub-
lications Service, Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 374 (1973). This purpose is relatively clear
from the face of the statute and is confirmed by the congressional debates: the
countervailing duty was intended to offset the unfair competitive advantage
that foreign producers would otherwise enjoy from export subsidies paid by
their governments. See, e.g., 30 CONG. REC., at 1674 (remarks by Sen.
Allison), 2205 (Sen. Caffery), 2225 (Sen. Lindsay). The Treasury Department
was well-positioned to establish rules of decision that would accurately carry
out this purpose, particularly since it had contributed the very figures relied
upon by Congress in enacting the statute. See Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168,
192 (1969).
In deciding in 1898 that a nonexcessive remission of indirect taxes did not
result in the type of competitive advantage that Congress intended to counter-
act, the Department was clearly acting in accordance with the shared assump-
tions of the day as to the fairness and economic effect of that practice. The
theory underlying the Department's position was that a foreign country's
remission of indirect taxes did not constitute subsidization of that country's
exports. Rather, such remission was viewed as a reasonable measure for avoid-
ing double taxation of exports-once by the foreign country and once upon
sale in this country. As explained in a recent study prepared by the Department
for the Senate Committee on Finance,
[the Department's construction was] based on the principle that, since exports are not
consumed in the country of production, they should not be subject to consumption
taxes in that country. The theory has been that the application of countervailing
duties to the rebate of consumption [and other indirect] taxes would have the effect
of double taxation of the product, since the United States would not only impose its
own indirect taxes, such as Federal and state excise taxes and state and local sales tax-
es, but would also collect, through the use of the countervailing duty, the indirect tax
imposed by the exporting country on domestically consumed goods. Executive
Branch GATT Studies, Senate Committee on Finance, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 17-18
(1974).
This intuitively appealing principle regarding double taxation had been widely
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accepted both in this country and abroad for many years prior to enactment of
the 1897 statute. See, e.g., Act of July 4, 1789, § 3, 1 Stat. 26 (remission of im-
port duties upon exportation of products); 4 D. Ricardo, Works and Corre-
spondence 216-217 (P. Sraffa ed. 1951) (first published in 1822); A. Smith, An
Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Book Four. ch.
IV (1776).
C.
The Secretary's interpretation of the countervailing duty statute is as per-
missible today as it was in 1898. The statute has been re-enacted five times by
Congress without any modification of the relevant language, see number 8,
supra, and, whether or not Congress can be said to have "acquiesced" in the ad-
ministrative practice, it certainly has not acted to change it. At the same time, the
Secretary's position has been incorporated into the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which is followed by every major trading nation in
the world; foreign tax systems as well as private expectations thus have been built
on the assumption that countervailing duties would not be imposed on nonex-
cessive remissions of indirect taxes. In light of these substantial reliance interests,
the longstanding administrative construction of the statute should "not be
disturbed except for cogent reasons." McLaren v. Fleischer, 256 U.S. 477, 481
(1921); see Udall v. Tallman, supra, 380 U.S., at 18.
III.
Notwithstanding all of the foregoing considerations, this would be a very
different case if, as petitioner contends, the Secretary's practice were contrary
to this Court's decision in Downs v. United States, supra, 187 U.S. 496. Upon
close examination of the admittedly opaque opinion in that case, however, we
do not believe that Downs is controlling on the question presented here.
The Russian sugar laws at issue in Downs were, as the Court noted, "very
complicated." Id., at 502. Much of the Court's opinion was devoted to an ex-
position of these provisions, see id., at 502-512, but for present purposes only
two features are relevant: (1) excise taxes imposed on sugar sales within Russia
were remitted on exports; and (2) the exporter received, in addition, a certi-
ficate entitling its bearer to sell an amount of sugar in Russia, equal to the
quantity exported, without paying the full excise tax otherwise due. This cer-
tificate was transferable and had a substantial market value related to the
amount of tax forgiveness that it carried with it.
The Secretary, following the same interpretation of the statute that he fol-
lowed here, imposed a countervailing duty based on the value of the certi-
ficates alone, and not on the excise taxes remitted on the exports themselves.
Downs, the importer, sought review, claiming that the Russian system did not
confer any countervailable bounty or grant within the meaning of the 1897
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statute. He did not otherwise challenge the amount of the duty assessed by the
Secretary.
The issue as it came before this Court, therefore, was whether a nonexces-
sive remission of an indirect tax, together with the granting of an additional
benefit represented by the value of the certificate, constituted a "bounty or
grant." Since the amount of the bounty was not in question, neither the parties
nor this Court focused carefully on the distinction between remission of the ex-
cise tax and conferral of the certificate. Petitioner argues, however, that cer-
tain broad language in the Court's opinion suggests that mere remission of a
tax, even if nonexcessive, must be considered a bounty or grant within the
meaning of the statute. Petitioner relies in particular on the following lan-
guage:
The details of this elaborate procedure for the production, sale, taxation and expor-
tation of Russian sugar are of much less importance than the two facts which appear
clearly through this maze of regulations, viz.: that no sugar is permitted to be sold in
Russia that does not pay an excise tax of R. 1.75 per pood, and that sugar exported
pays no tax at all .... When a tax is imposed upon all sugar produced, but is remitted
upon all sugar exported, then, by whatever process, or in whatever manner, or under
whatever name it is disguised, it is a bounty upon exportation. Id., at 515.
This passage is inconsistent with both preceding and subsequent language
which suggests that the Court understood the "bounty" to reside in the value
of the certificates. At one point the Court stated that "[tihe amount [the ex-
porter] receives for his export certificate [on the market], say, R. 1.25, is the
exact amount of the bounty he receives upon exportation. . . ." 187 U.S., at
515. And the Court in conclusion specifically endorsed the Fourth Circuit's
holding to the same effect, see n. 17, supra:
[T]he Circuit Court of Appeals found: "That the Russian exporter of sugar obtained
from his government a certificate, solely because of such exportation, which is worth
in the open market of that country from R. 125 to R. 1.64 per pood, or from 1.8 to
2.35 cents per pound. Therefore we hold that the government of Russia does secure
to the exporter of that country, as the inevitable result of its action, a money reward
or gratuity whenever he exports sugar from Russia." We all concur in this expression
of opinion. 187 U.S., at 516.
Given this other language, we cannot read for its broadest implications the
passage on which petitioner relies. In our view the passage does no more than
establish the proposition that an excessive remission of taxes-there, the com-
bination of the exemption with the certificates-is an export bounty within the
meaning of the statute.
As the court below noted, "'[it is a maxim, not to be disregarded, that gen-
eral expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case
in which those expressions are used.'" 562 F.2d, at 1213, quoting Cohens v.
Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 398 (1821). No one argued in Downs that a nonex-
cessive remission of taxes, standing alone, would have constituted a bounty on
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exportation, and indeed that issue was not presented on the facts of the case. It
must-also be remembered, of course, that the Court did affirm the Secretary's
decision, and that decision rested on the conclusion that a bounty had been
paid only to the extent that the remission exceeded the taxes otherwise due. In
light of all these circumstances, the isolated statement in Downs relied upon by
petitioner cannot be dispositive here.
The judgment of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals is, accordingly,
Affirmed.
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